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Evolution of the Global Risk Network
Mean-Field Stability Point
Xiang Niu, Alaa Moussawi, Noemi Derzsy, Xin Lin, Gyorgy Korniss and Boleslaw
K. Szymanski
Abstract With a steadily growing human population and rapid advancements in
technology, the global human network is increasing in size and connection density.
This growth exacerbates networked global threats and can lead to unexpected con-
sequences such as global epidemics mediated by air travel, threats in cyberspace,
global governance, etc. A quantitative understanding of the mechanisms guiding
this global network is necessary for proper operation and maintenance of the global
infrastructure. Each year the World Economic Forum publishes an authoritative re-
port on global risks, and applying this data to a CARP model, we answer critical
questions such as how the network evolves over time. In the evolution, we com-
pare not the current states of the global risk network at different time points, but its
steady state at those points, which would be reached if the risk were left unabated.
Looking at the steady states show more drastically the differences in the challenges
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to the global economy and stability the world community had faced at each point of
the time. Finally, we investigate the influence between risks in the global network,
using a method successful in distinguishing between correlation and causation. All
results presented in the paper were obtained using detailed mathematical analysis
with simulations to support our findings.
1 Introduction
Recently, cascading failures have been extensively studied [11, 7, 6, 12, 1, 10]. Most
studies focus on financial institutions, internet and infrastructure systems [4, 5]. Cas-
cades of global risks can be modeled with Cascades Alternating Renewal Processes
(CARP) [2]. In the simplest version of this model, a system alternates between states
of being operational or in failure, denoted by 0 and 1 respectively. In terms of global
risks, an active risk is represented by a failed node (state 1), and a dormant risk is a
node in the operational state (state 0). During state transitions, we assume the risks
are triggered by non-homogeneous Poisson processes [11]. Given the complexity of
real-world interactions, global risk probabilities have strong interdependence.
As mentioned above, the CARP models entities oscillating between a set of
states. At the minimum, which is the case of global risk network analyzed in this
paper, two states are defined as operational and failed. In global risk network, each
risk is in either in active or dormant state and at random times undergoes one of the
two transitions. The first is risk activation that moves the risk from dormant to ac-
tive state and the other is recovery transition which reverses the first one. In [6], we
show a model using three states in which recovery is a state not a transition. Here,
we further subdivide the activation transition into internal activation and external
activation transitions. The three transitions are represented as Poisson processes de-
fined as follows [11].
• Internal activation: a dormant risk i is activated internally with intensity λ inti . The
Poisson probability of transition in time unit is pinti = 1− e
−λ inti .
• External activation: a dormant risk i is activated externally by an active risk j
with intensity λ exti . The corresponding Poisson probability is p
ext
ji = 1− e
−λ exti .
• Internal recovery: an active risk i is deactivated internally with probability preci .
Conversely, the active risk i continues being active with intensity λ coni . The cor-
responding Poisson probability is pconi = 1− e
−λ coni = 1− preci .
There are some similarities between the CARP model [2] and epidemic mod-
els, such as SIS [9], if we consider risks as a population undergoing infection with
the activation pathogen. Yet deeper comparison reveals that the CARP model is
more complex by including hidden from observations exogenous (infection) and
endogenous (falling into activity without or not through contact with active risks)
transitions into activity. Thus, the challenges like finding model parameters match-
ing historical data to enable the model to compute probabilities of exogenous and
endogenous activations and establish probabilities for st
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in epidemics models. Another significant difference is the transition probabilities
evolve as new threats arise, old ones die, and some existing risks increase their
probability to activate, while others decrease their probabilities as a result of the in-
creasing resilience mounted by threatened governments, organizations and people.
Based on the likelihood li provided by experts in WEF Global Risk Reports [13,
14] for each risk i, we obtain a normalized likelihood Li, which indicates how
likely a risk i is to be active. Let λ inti = −α ln(1− Li), λ
ext
i = −β ln(1− Li),
λ coni =−γ ln(1−Li), Szymanski, et al. [11] define
pinti = 1− (1−Li)
α
pextji = 1− (1−Li)
β
pconi = 1− (1−Li)
γ
. (1)
The advantage of Eq. (1) is that the probabilities of the three Poisson processes are
all defined by the normalized likelihood Li with additional (positive) control param-
eters α,β ,γ . The quality of WEF expert likelihood assessment can be measured by
how close γ expressed in time units used by expert is to one, since with γ=1, the
probability of an active risk i to continue being active is equal to the normalized
assessment Li.
After combining the probabilities of all possible Poisson processes in the risk
network, we obtain the state transition probabilities [11] as
Pi(t)
0→1 = 1− (1− pinti )(1− p
ext
ji )
∑ j∈Ni s j(t)
Pi(t)
1→1 = pconi
Pi(t)
0→0 = 1−Pi(t)
0→1
Pi(t)
1→0 = 1−Pi(t)
1→1
, (2)
where Pi(t)
0→1 represents the probability of the state of risk i being changed from
dormant to active at time t, Ni is the set of nodes connected to risk i, and s j(t)
represents the state of risk j at time t (0 is dormant, 1 is active).
The transition probability of risk i at time t is given as Pi(t)
si(t)→si(t+1), the vec-
tor of transition probabilities of all risks is
−−→
S(t) = ∏Ri=1 Pi(t)
si(t)→si(t+1), where R
denotes the number of risks. The likelihood of the sequence of state transition of
all risks is L(
−−→
S(1),
−−→
S(2), ...,
−−→
S(T )) = ∏T−1t=1 ∏
R
i=1Pi(t)
si(t)→si(t+1), T representing the
number of time steps during the entire model simulation [11]. The log-likelihood is
lnL(
−−→
S(1),
−−→
S(2), ...,
−−→
S(T )) =
T−1
∑
t=1
R
∑
i=1
lnPi(t)
si(t)→si(t+1)
. (3)
We compute the optimal values of model parameters α,β , and γ by maximizing
the loglikelihood in Eq. (3) of the observed state transition processes [3, 8]. Then,
with these optimal values, we can simulate CARP model to collect the changes of
the stable states of the global risk network at any point of time for which we have
historical data.
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From the observations of both historical events and WEF Global Risk Re-
ports [13, 14], we find that the global risk network constantly evolves as new threats
arise, and some existing risk increase their probability to activate, while others de-
cline their probabilities as a result of the increasing resilience mounted by threatened
governments, organizations and people. This evolution causes continuous changes
in the current state of the global risks and their probabilities. However, if left un-
abated, the global risk network would move from the current state to the steady
state, in which some risk activities will be much more frequent and their threats
much more pronounced. This is why, in this paper, we do not compare the states of
the global risk network at some points of time (in case of this paper, January 2013
and August 2017). Instead, we compare the steady states to which these initial states
would move if no changes to the system had been introduced. Looking at the steady
states show more drastically the differences in the challenges to the global economy
and stability the world community had faced at each point of the time.
2 Risk Networks
In the World Economic Forum (WEF) Global Risk Reports [13, 14], experts define
risks grouped into 5 categories. The list of risks is shown in Fig. 1. In the 2013
risk network, 1-10 are economic risks, 11-20 are environmental risks, 21-30 are
geopolitical risks, 31-40 are societal risks, and 41-50 are technological risks. In the
2017 risk network, 1-9 are economic risks, 10-14 are environmental risks, 15-20 are
geopolitical risks, 21-26 are societal risks, and 27-30 are technological risks.
We utilize the event dataset created for [11], which includes news, academic
articles, Wikipedia entries, etc. from Jan. 2000 to Dec. 2012, and based on this we
generate 13x12x50=7800 data points for the 2013 risk network. For the 2017 risk
network, we relabel prior events and collect new events from Jan. 2013 to Aug.
2017. Thus the total number of data points is (17x12+8)x30=6360. Each data point
indicates if a risk is active or dormant in a certain month.
We obtain the optimal values of model parametersα,β ,γ in Table 1 by maximiz-
ing the log-likelihood from Eq. (3) of the observed state transition processes [3, 8].
The state transition processes are expressed in time measured in monthly units. In
the 2013 network, most of the event-triggered risks are continually active or dor-
mant. In the 2017 network many risks are intermittently active, thus both risk ac-
tivation and recovery probabilities increase (in terms of parameters α,β increase,
γ decreases). Although the average degree of the 2013 risk network is larger than
that of the 2017 risk network, since the 2017 network is smaller, its risks have a
higher probability of being connected, and have larger mean clustering coefficient
and smaller diameter.
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05.Fiscal crises in key economies
06.High structural (un−/under−)employment
08.Severe energy price shock
03.Failure of a major financial mechanism or Inst.
04.Failure/shortfall of critical infrastructure
01.Asset bubbles in a major economy
11.Failure of climate−change adaptation
14.Man−made Envr. damage and disasters
14.Man−made Envr. damage and disasters
21.Failure of urban planning
10.Extreme weather events
14.Man−made Envr. damage and disasters
12.Major biodiversity loss and ecosystem collapse
13.Major natural disasters
13.Major natural disasters
19.State collapse or crisis
20.Weapons of mass destruction
17.Interstate conflict with regional Cons.
16.Failure of regional or global governance
15.Failure of national governance
18.Large−scale terrorist attacks
07.Illicit trade
22.Food crises
25.Rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases
23.Large−scale involuntary migration
25.Rapid and massive spread of infectious diseases
26.Water crises
28.Breakdown of critical Info. Infra. and networks
29.Large−scale cyberattacks
30.Massive incident of data fraud/theft
27.Adverse consequences of technological advances
27.Adverse consequences of technological advances
27.Adverse consequences of technological advances
27.Adverse consequences of technological advances
27.Adverse consequences of technological advances
02.Deflation in a major economy
09.Unmanageable inflation
24.Profound social instability
0 .2 .4 .6 .8 1
2017 network
0.2.4.6.81
2013 network
01.Chronic fiscal imbalances
02.Chronic labour market imbalances
03.Extreme volatility in energy & Agri. prices
04.Hard landing of an emerging economy
05.Major systemic financial failure
06.Prolonged infrastructure neglect
07.Recurring liquidity crises
08.Severe income disparity
09.Unforeseen negative consequences of regulation
11.Antibiotic−resistant bacteria
12.Failure of climate change adaptation
13.Irremediable pollution
14.Land and waterway use mismanagement
15.Mismanaged urbanization
16.Persistent extreme weather
17.Rising greenhouse gas emissions
18.Species overexploitation
19.Unprecedented geophysical destruction
20.Vulnerability to geomagnetic storms
21.Critical fragile states
22.Diffusion of weapons of mass destruction
23.Entrenched organized crime
24.Failure of diplomatic conflict resolution
25.Global governance failure
26.Militarization of space
27.Pervasive entrenched corruption
28.Terrorism
29.Unilateral resource nationalization
30.Widespread illicit trade
31.Backlash against globalization
32.Food shortage crises
33.Ineffective illicit drug policies
34.Mismanagement of population aging
35.Rising rates of chronic disease
36.Rising religious fanaticism
37.Unmanaged migration
38.Unsustainable population growth
39.Vulnerability to pandemics
40.Water supply crises
41.Critical systems failure
42.Cyber attacks
43.Failure of intellectual property regime
45.Massive incident of data fraud/theft
46.Mineral resource supply vulnerability
47.Proliferation of orbital debris
44.Massive digital misinformation
48.Unforeseen Cons. of climate change mitigation
49.Unforeseen consequences of nanotechnology
50.Unforeseen Cons. of new life science technologies
10.Unmanageable inflation or deflation
10.Unmanageable inflation or deflation
Fig. 1 The mean-field stable probabilities of risks being active in 2013 and 2017 networks.
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Table 1 Network properties of 2013 and 2017 risk networks.
Network Nodes Edges Avg. degree Edge Prob. Avg. CC. Diameter α β γ
2013 50 515 20.60 0.42 0.61 3 3.04e−3 1.17e−3 3.56
2017 30 275 18.33 0.63 0.74 2 5.28e−3 3.03e−3 2.50
2.1 Stability Points
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Fig. 2 Asymptotic mean-field stable frequencies of selected risks being active are shown for 2013
risk network. Each frequency value is averaged over 1000 runs. For time denoted on x axis as Inf,
the frequencies are calculated by Eq. (5).
With the learned parametersα,β ,γ , and the activation and recovery probabilities,
we perform Monte Carlo simulations of the cascades of global risks. Fig. 2 shows
the frequency of a risk being active at each time step t during the simulation of
2013 risk network. The frequency of risk i being active at time t is the number of
simulations in which risk i is active as a fraction of all simulations. We find that
the frequency distributions of risks being active eventually saturates. By denoting
the probability of risk i being active at time t as pi(t), we define such frequency to
be stable when pi(t)≈ pi(t + 1). By plugging in the state transition probabilities in
Eq. (2), we have
(1− pi(t))Pi(t)
0→1+ pi(t)Pi(t)
1→1 = pi(t + 1) = pi(t). (4)
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Thus,
pˆi =
P0→1i
P0→1i + 1−P
1→1
i
=
1− (1−Li)
α+β ∑ j∈Ni pˆ j
1− (1−Li)
α+β ∑ j∈Ni pˆ j +(1−Li)γ
, (5)
where pˆi is the steady state probability of risk i being active, computed with a suc-
cessive approximation method (Fig. 1).
2.2 Risk Evolution
Fig. 1 shows the evolution of the global risk network and its mean-field stability
point. To clearly see the changes in risks, we display related risks and their indices
in the two networks side by side. From 2013 to 2017 five risk categories remain the
same, while around 20 risks vanish or merge into other risks. Risk 10, “Unmanage-
able inflation or deflation” splits into risk 02 “Deflation in a major economy” and 09
“Unmanageable inflation”. Risk 15 “Mismanaged urbanization” changes from En-
vironmental to Geopolitical and is renamed as risk 21 “Failure of urban planning”.
Risk 30 “Widespread illicit trade” is changed from Geopolitical to Economic and
renamed as risk 07 “Illicit trade”, whereas Risk 24 “Profound social instability” is
newly proposed.
Comparing the mean-field stable probabilities of risks from 2013 and 2017, we
find that the probabilities of economic risks generally and significantly decrease,
reflecting a gradual global recovery from the 2008 economic crisis. Only 07 “Illicit
trade”, 18 “Large scale terrorist attacks” and 23 “Large scale involuntary migration”
significantly increase in the category of economic, geopolitical, and societal risks,
respectively. This reveals the negative effects of globalization. Considering envi-
ronmental risks, we find that man made risks decrease, while only nature risks 10
“Extreme weather events” and 13 “Major natural disasters” increase. The abilities
of the public to prevent the environmental degradation are improved. In technologi-
cal risks category, risk 30 “Massive incident of data fraud/theft” increases due to the
boom of private data in the internet era.
3 Transition Fractions
With the steady state probability of a risk being active, we can compute the proba-
bility of three different transitions:
• internal activation: Ainti = (1− pˆi)p
int
i probability of dormant risk i (1− pˆi) being
triggered internally pinti .
• external activation: Aexti = (1− pˆi)[1− (1− p
ext
ji )
∑ j∈Ni pˆ j ] probability of dormant
risk i (1− pˆi) being triggered externally 1− (1− p
ext
ji )
∑ j∈Ni pˆ j .
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Fig. 3 The fraction of internal and external activations for each risk.
• internal recovery: Areci = pˆi p
rec
i probability of active risk i (pˆi) recovering p
rec
i .
For simplicity, we ignore the probability of a risk being activated both internally
and externally with probability (1− pˆi)p
int
i [1− (1− p
ext
ji )
∑ j∈Ni pˆ j ] (the value is neg-
ligible). Thus, the three transitions can be treated as independent variables. With
the probabilities of transitions, we can get the fraction of one transition to all pos-
sible transitions for each risk by setting ainti =
Ainti
Ainti +A
ext
i +A
rec
i
, aexti =
Aexti
Ainti +A
ext
i +A
rec
i
,
areci =
Areci
Ainti +A
ext
i +A
rec
i
. The values are plotted in Fig. 3. By nature of activation and
recovery, for each risk, the recovery accounts for half of the transitions. For most of
the risks, external activation is more frequent than internal activation. Around one
fourth of the activations are triggered internally, while the other three fourths are
triggered externally. According to Eq. (1)
Aexti
Ainti
=
[1− (1− pextji )
∑ j∈Ni pˆ j ]
pinti
=
1− (1−Li)
β ∑ j∈Ni pˆ j
1− (1−Li)α
. (6)
Applying Taylor’s Approximation, (1− x)m ≈ 1−mx, when mx → 0, we obtain
1−(1−Li)
β ∑ j∈Ni
pˆ j
1−(1−Li)α
≈
Liβ ∑ j∈Ni pˆ j
Liα
=
β ∑ j∈Ni pˆ j
α . The average of
β ∑ j∈Ni pˆ j
α is around 2.69
for the 2013 network and 3.07 for the 2017 network. Despite β being smaller than
α , the network structure amplifies the effects of external activations.
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The risks in the 2017 network tend to cluster together and are more likely to
be triggered externally in general. A few risks in the 2013 network are almost iso-
lated and are always triggered internally, including 20 “Vulnerability to geomagnetic
storms” (6 neighbors), 26 “Militarization of space” (5 neighbors), 47 “Proliferation
of orbital debris” (3 neighbors) and 49 “Unforeseen consequences of nanotechnol-
ogy” (2 neighbors).
4 Risk Influence
In this section, we calculate the influence of risks on each other. In the experiments,
we first disable a risk i by setting its normalized likelihood Li = 0, and then calculate
the new external activation frequency of risk j as aextj−i ( j 6= i). We obtain
Ii→ j = a
ext
j − a
ext
j−i, (7)
where Ii→ j is an indicator of the influence risk i has on risk j, quantifying the exter-
nal activation effects of risk i onto risk j.
The influence of risk 01 “Asset bubbles in a major economy” in the 2017 network
is most pronounced of economic risks, with the top three influenced risks being
economic. The top sixteen influenced risks are simply the nearest neighbors of the
source risk. When testing the influence of other risks in both the 2013 and the 2017
networks, we found that for any risk i with n nearest neighbors, its top n influenced
risks are always those neighbors. The topology of the network has a prominent
effect on the influence. Fig. 4 shows an example of the difference of influences of
risks on their one-hop (nearest) and two-hops neighbors in 2017 network. One-hop
neighbors are immediately affected, but the impact decreases with time; while two-
hop neighbors need more time to react, with a peak at approximately 20 time steps.
Fig. 4 Monte Carlo simula-
tion of risk influences. For
each risk i, we calculate sep-
arately the average influence
on the risks in its first and
second neighborhood layers.
We activate the risk i at step 0
and record its influences at ev-
ery time step. Each influence
value in the plot is averaged
over 1000 runs and 30 risks.
 0
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1 10 100 1000
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Fig. 5 shows the influence of a category of risks on other categories, which dis-
cerns between cause and correlation of risks. The influence of category ci on c j is
calculated as
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Fig. 5 Normalized influences among risk categories.
Ici→c j =


∑i∈ci , j∈c j Ii→ j
|ci||c j |
(ci 6= c j)
∑i∈ci , j∈c j , j 6=i Ii→ j
|ci|(|c j |−1)
(ci = c j)
, (8)
where Ii→ j is the influence of risk i on j, ci,c j represent one of the 5 risk categories:
economic, environmental, geopolitical, societal, and technological. With the unity-
based normalization of the influences, we find that most categories have large self-
influence (diagonal elements). From 2013 to 2017, the most significant changes of
risk influences are economic and technological ones. The economic risks used to be
the most influential risks and had the highest impact on other risks. However, as of
2017, their influences have decreased. In 2013, technological risks were the most
vulnerable risks and had very limited influences on others. Although they are still
the least influential risks in 2017, we can see an increasing trend in their influence.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we use the CARP model to simulate cascades in global risk networks.
With parameters learned by MLE methods from a real event dataset, we compute
the mean-field steady state probabilities of risks being active. By computing the
difference of external activation frequencies of risk j with enabling and disabling
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risk i, we define an influence Ii→ j of risk i on j. The results of the 2013 and 2017
risk networks show significant changes in asymptotic mean-field probabilities of
risk activations. The activation probabilities and influences of economic risks are
dramatically reduced as a signal of economic recovery since 2013. The increase
in activation probability of illicit trade and migration show the negative effects of
globalization. Technological risks are becoming influential due to the increase of
private data leaks.
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